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Those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like the ant, they only collect and use; the men of dogmas are like the spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance.  But the bee takes a middle course: it gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and of the field, but transforms and digests it by a power of its own. Not unlike this is the business of true philosophy; for it neither relies solely or chiefly on the powers of the mind, nor does it take the matter which it gathers from natural history and mechanical experiments and lay it up in memory whole, as it finds it. But lays it up in the understanding altered and digested. Therefore, from a closer and purer league between these two faculties, the experimental and the rational (such as has never before been made), much may be hoped.











	Bacon’s method of induction is distinct from the inductive method based on a classical conception of it, deriving from Aristotle. To make this clear, we can call Bacon’s method “investigative” as opposed to the older “ampliative” or “abstractive” induction.  Bacon himself proposed the method of experiment, or investigative induction, in order to contrast it with Aristotle’s ampliative induction. This contrast is often missed because of a recurring problem in philosophy of science. This central problem rests on an unfortunate confusion of experimentalism with empiricism. 

	Experimentalism is the method of induction by observation and experiment that seeks to establish general principles that constitute new learning. Experimental investigations themselves predate Bacon’s investigative method, for instance in studies of alchemy and of optics. Investigative induction, or “the experimental method” is well known to scientists in their successful use of it in practice. (Bacon [1605] 1989, [1620] 1960; Boyle [1661] 2003; Hooke [1665] 1961; Newton [1687] 1969, [1704] 1952). Although Bacon and Boyle made a good beginning at describing it, (Sargent 2001; McMullin 2001) it is not very clearly described any more.  Primarily, an experiment is an investigation of an aspect of a thing that is not readily available for observation without making a special effort. It is our task below to find a clearer description of the method of experimental, skeptical or investigative induction using contemporary terminology for describing it.   

Empiricism is a combination of two doctrines, for which the word has come to stand since the eighteenth century. The doctrine of limitation: The first of these component doctrines is ascribed to the Peripatetic school, namely, that nothing is in the mind that has not first come into it from the senses. Sensations thus limit our knowledge in some way. If we want to avoid confusion, it is better not to call this pseudo-Aristotelian doctrine, all by itself, “empiricism.” The doctrine of subjective ideas: The other part of the compound doctrine of empiricism is derived from Descartes’ “new way of ideas.” Information about a thing is represented in us, according to the doctrine, as a sensible idea, being a particular, subjective phantasm (image or impression), which is passively received by the sense. Descartes first grasped fully the passive subjectivity of “adventitious ideas of experience,” presupposing the general understanding at the time that a perception consists initially of external signals being received by sense in a passive manner. This understanding followed Ibn Al Haytham’s more particular discovery that the visual perception of an object begins with light, reflected from the object, entering the eye. It projects an inverted two-dimensional image of the object in the eye. (Haytham, [1030] 1989.) The passivity of the organ of perception and the nature of the image as well as the means of transmission have since been key factors in philosophy in general, and in epistemology and metaphysics in particular, though there was some discussion of it in ancient times. (Plato [360 B.C.E.] 1973).

	John Locke gives us the earliest account of empiricism ([1690] 1965).  The conflation of experimentalism with empiricism has made it hard for us to see how an investigative experimental method could possibly work. If we try to understand induction as the generalization of objective laws from particulars, we are trapped in the ampliative conception of induction; and this makes it hard to see that investigative induction, practiced in experimental science, works quite well. The key to understanding investigative induction is that it can assume that the appearances of things are in the form of statements of universal claims. (Appearances may also be embodied in statements of particulars, but I will not be stressing that here.) Empiricism assumes that the data from sense must be particular and subjective, with which assumption an investigative induction dispenses entirely.

2. Methods of Inquiry
	In ancient times, two methods for learning or inquiry stood out as pre-eminent.  One of these was a method first employed reportedly by Socrates, and illustrated in a series of dialogues by Plato, with Socrates as one of the interlocutors.  This method of critical questioning showed logical inconsistencies in the assumptions of interlocutors, which emerged in the process of Socrates’ search for truth (about virtue and knowledge.) This method was amply illustrated in Plato’s writing, but not as carefully described in it.  Description was later attempted as “skepticism,” and the method described was much augmented, in a number of different versions. Descriptions of skepticism as a method and a doctrine are found among the so- called “Academics,” in the later Academy of Plato, and still later as a method but not a doctrine among Pyrrhonians, and especially in one school of medical practitioners, the Empirics (Empiricus [c. 200] 1996).

	The Socratic method seemed limited to Aristotle. Aristotle thought that to understand reality one must not only think carefully, but also methodically consult the evidence of sense. Aristotle’s method, as embodied in the Organon​[2]​, is to ask a why-question about some thing or event, and answer it methodically. In order to answer this question, the first step is to seek the nature of the thing or event about which we asked the question. We seek to find its nature in sensory evidence, when we perceive the thing or event in normal conditions without obstruction. Once the form or nature of the thing of which we seek knowledge has been perceptually grasped, we take the statement of this nature (a general definitive statement, a “first principle”) as one of the premises of a formally valid argument, and derive as a conclusion that which was to be explained.  Aristotle called the method of deriving conclusions validly from appropriate premises “analytic.”  It was based on an interpretation of the logical structure of statements. Stoics later called this study of valid analytic forms “logic,” and nowadays the general theory is known as “formal logic,” or “mathematical logic,” given recent advances in the study of valid algebraic logical forms.  Probability theory may be included as an extension of logic. For our purposes, we can classify all these variations as a part of, or as modifications of, Aristotle’s Organon.

	Induction, in the Organon, was understood as the method by which first principles are established from the evidence of the senses. If we can enumerate and examine all the instances of a general law, or of a “first principle,” then we can grasp the truth of the principle under which the instances fall.  Unless all the instances are given, this cannot be valid as a formal exercise. Then its application to its instances becomes pointless. Aristotle’s theory of perception and understanding, if true, would of course permit general knowledge even when the enumeration of particulars is incomplete.  The Organon relied on such a theory of direct perception of the natures of things, with certain caveats.

	In the New Organon, Bacon contrasted his new method of induction with all the methods of induction contemplated in Aristotle’s Organon.  The true (new) method of “induction,” yields first principles of the nature of things just as the Peripatetic method did. Bacon repudiated the old method as “childish.” Logic, he thought, came in too late in Aristotle’s story to be of much benefit to discover the natures of things. In order to avoid confusion, I call Bacon’s new experimental method “investigative” and the older method “ampliative.”

	Bacon proposed a skeptical, or Socratic, examination of nature itself. Just as Socrates had used the skeptical method to examine the thought of his interlocutors, Bacon suggested that we conduct a Socratic examination of nature. The new method asks us to find discrepancies in the appearances of things, and use these discrepancies to sift out the reality behind the conflicting appearances. Investigating them critically, in the manner of Socrates, we find the true principles.  “…[T]he induction which is to be available for the discovery and demonstration of the sciences and arts, must analyze nature by proper rejections and exclusions; and then, after a sufficient number of negatives, come to a conclusion on the affirmative instances—which has not yet been done or even attempted, save only by Plato, who does indeed employ this form of induction to a certain extent for the purpose of discussing definitions and ideas.” ([1620] 1960, Bk. I Aphorism CV) 

	The brilliance of his new method lies in the fact that because it is itself skeptical, or Socratic, (I will not make fine distinctions here) it is immune to the ravages of skeptical doubt.  It uses the skeptical method itself to provide “helps” to the understanding.  It is also a method that is informed about the real natures of ordinary things, since it deals with appearances of things, just as Aristotle’s Organon did. Whereas Aristotle’s method relied upon a dogmatic manner of arriving at first principles, as Bacon admonishes us, Bacon proposed a skeptical method of inquiry in its stead, which proceeded through intermediate steps to discerning the true nature of a thing. It is not a skepticism that leads to no knowledge, but true knowledge, he says: “It will also be thought that by forbidding men to pronounce and to set down principles as established until they have duly arrived through the intermediate steps at the highest generalities, I maintain a sort of suspension of judgment, and bring it what the Greeks call Acatalespsia—a denial of the mind to comprehend the truth. But in reality that which I meditate and propound is not Acatalepsia but Eucatalepsia; not denial of the capacity to understand but provision for understanding truly. For I do not take away the authority from the senses, but supply them with helps; I do not slight the understanding, but govern it. And better surely it is that we should know all we need to know, and yet think our knowledge imperfect, than that we should think our knowledge perfect, and yet not know anything we need to know.” ([1620] 1960, Aphorism CV, Bk. I)

	Bacon’s main addition to the method of skeptical inquiry directed at interrogating nature is to suggest that we do not try to solve each riddle or discrepancy one by one, leaping to the highest level of generality from it, but rather to postpone the search.  We first make a careful collection of discrepancies in the appearance of things. This is the “help” his method suggests for our understanding. Once we decipher the source of the emanation of all the discrepancies at once, we have a true insight into the thing itself.  In this process, we become connoisseurs of the discrepancies among phenomena, bringing to them a kind of naïveté that is born of a cultivated skepticism. Thus, when he proposes that we should free our mind of all prejudices, and rid our thoughts of all systems of philosophy, he does not mean that we should disbelieve any theories, or believe them to be false. Rather, he suggests the skeptic’s method of suspension of judgment concerning all preconceived answers. Then we let the appearances themselves tell us what is the case, by allowing their discrepancies to guide us towards their hidden treasure.  We suspend judgment so that we can hear nature speak.

	This investigative method has been misunderstood quite often, because it has seemed to be impossible that nature can speak to us, or that nature can possibly be like a book that we can read. Most philosophers suppose that if we rid our mind of all preconceived notions, then we would have nothing worth discussing that we observe. My task, therefore, will be to show how an experimental method is possible, and why it has seemed impossible to his critics.

3. Appearances Deceive
	Early in the seventeenth century, there was considerable interest in the problem of the “deception of the senses.”  There were several reasons for the belief in deception. Three come to mind. Discoveries made by alchemists and apothecaries seem to have called into question the usefulness of the Peripatetic “natures” that were commonly accepted to be observable in ordinary things.  Ordinary things may possess unsuspected chemical or medicinal properties that are not derivable from their essential natures, especially when these presumed natures are established by simple perceptions when conditions are favorable for cognitive grasp. (Gunpowder, for instance.) For alchemy and medicine, our perceptual judgment of ordinary things under normal circumstances seems inadequate.  In Bacon’s New Organon, this appears to be the main source of belief that our senses deceive us systematically. The complaint that appearances deceive, however, is quite widespread. In a separate development, the Copernican hypothesis also implied that we live on a moving earth, even though, in reports over many thousand years, people’s perceptual judgment concurred in the opinion that we live on a stationary earth.  Only a few earlier philosophers had envisaged the possibility that the earth may move, but none had suggested it as a perceptual report. As the Copernican claim became more and more acceptable, this deception of the senses came to be seen as a plain fact. Bacon’s thought was perhaps not influenced by this reason, or the next, for his belief in apparent deception.  The study of optics had also clearly shown, since Al-Haytham’s great book on it in the eleventh century, (Haytham [1060] 2003) that there are certain odd illusions that call into question the very mechanism of visual perception as true mirrors of nature. A number of philosophers, such as Kepler, Galileo, Mersenne, Descartes, Bayle and Hobbes were keenly aware of the deception of the senses involved in optics, and they all wished to blunt its force.  

	Some seventeenth century philosophers sought refuge in skepticism, whether in a weak or a strong form (Mersenne and Bayle, for instance.) Two new methods were proposed for the resolution of this vexing difficulty, which are pre-eminent: Descartes’ and Bacon’s. Descartes proposed a method that showed how knowledge is possible by reducing skepticism to absurdity, by means of his famous cogito argument. He also proposed a “touchstone” theory of method, namely, that we can establish principles of mathematics on the basis of clear and distinct ideas, which serve as a touchstone for all reality. If our senses are more or less deceptive, we can use valid mathematical intuitions to adjudicate between those appearances that are more and those that are less representative of the real world.  On Descartes’ understanding, we regard the senses themselves as providing us with ideas, in the form of images (accurate or distorted) of the real things around us. Where perceptions are distorted, we use mathematical models or hypotheses that capture whatever is real behind the distorted images in our minds.  In the end we must rely on certain special intuitions (clear and distinct ideas) to adjudicate between the deceptive sensual ideas and those that are veridical.

	Bacon proposed his own experimental method, prior to Descartes, with a different response to the problem of the deception of the senses.  In this method, we use skepticism as a tool in the investigation of nature.  We cast off all preconceptions about what is taken to be real, and attend merely to what appears to be the case.  But in doing so we pay particular attention to discrepancies in what appears to be the case.  Then we make a whole list of as many such discrepancies as we can find.  If we find the source of all these discrepancies, then we have the hidden and formative nature of the thing to be investigated.  However, it takes ingenuity to find even one reality behind discrepant appearances. If we are fortunate enough to find a source of many such discrepancies, then the veristic character of that source seems almost assured.  Of course, it is not certain: another discrepancy may be found later that shows up our first discovery as an error. Bacon calls a discovery of this kind of spurious but good induction a “first vintage,” as befits a connoisseur of skeptical difficulties. Investigative induction is by its nature uncertain.

	The end result of this method is not just a verbal principle like Aristotle’s, but also one that gives us the means to create appearances in things that we previously could not influence. If we know under what conditions a certain unusual appearance of a thing is found, then we can create that appearance by creating the condition.  It is a practically useful philosophy, though the practical usefulness falls out of a Socratic search for the truth. Bacon ([1620] 1960, Bk. II, Aphorism I) describes the value of his method of investigative induction as giving us power over nature, though its objective is truth.  “On a given body to generate and superinduce a new nature or new natures is the work of and aim of human power. Of a given nature to discover the true form, or true specific difference, or nature-engendering nature, or source of emanation, (for these are the terms which come nearest to a description of the thing), is the work and aim of human knowledge.” 

 	In this very general description of what his investigative method is designed to accomplish, he alludes to “true form” and “nature-engendering nature.”  These are puzzling phrases.  Understanding them will show why I speak of Bacon’s chosen phenomena (also called “prerogative instances”) as “discrepancies” in appearance. A thing can have but one form, or nature.  What could “form-engendering forms” or “nature-engendering natures” possibly be? To interpret these phrases, let us pretend to be Aristotelians. Under certain (normal) conditions we believe that the true nature of a thing reveals itself to us.  Then we can call this appearance of the thing its “nature.” But, if it reveals two different natures in two different perceptual circumstances they cannot both be the true nature of the same thing. So we record these two natures as (discrepant) appearances, and neither as real. We seek the true nature or nature-engendering nature or source of emanation (of discrepant appearances) as the aim and work of knowledge. 

Bacon’s contribution to the theory of experiment is to suggest that we become collectors and connoisseurs of such puzzling phenomena, to be deposited in natural histories.  In this he is going beyond the old dogmatisms and skepticisms of ancient philosophy. He is more skeptical than the skeptic. He challenges the skeptic’s assent merely to appearances when the senses deceive us.  The skeptic is also leaping to a needlessly high level of generality. Bacon demands an account of how this very appearance deceives us, which is at the intermediate level.  Bacon has a keen insight here.  If we know that we are being deceived, then we must know that something appears in incompatible ways. This is a clue. We do not leap to skepticism as a solution, but seek to find out the source of this discrepancy. Each such clue goes towards making up a puzzle to be solved by the scientist. Armed with so many clues, we can be sure that when we find their source we do not have just verbal knowledge, but “we have a hold of the thing itself,” in Bacon’s words.  Bacon does not claim that this method gives us a certain truth, or even truth, but rather that it yields principles that, even if false, will be practically useful, by giving us “power over nature.”  

4. The Experimental Method
	Bacon’s investigative induction is an interpretation of nature that has been freed of all its many apparent discrepancies.  The manner in which we arrive at such an interpretation is the work of “understanding.”  Einstein (1954) described this as a kind of detective work. Kuhn (1962) generalized Einstein’s description as “puzzle solving.” Tyrone Lai (1989) calls it “cryptanalysis.” That is the kind of induction from the facts that Bacon proposed.  He called it “interpreting” nature, like a book. Of course we can never know if we have collected all the discrepancies before we make a claim about the true nature of a thing. Can we ever fully understand any book? Bacon thus leaves the discovery involved in an experimental process (evocatively described as a “first vintage”)  open to further revision.






	It is generally not knowable how many phenomena we need collected before a true induction is possible.  If this number were finite, and if the phenomena were known in advance, the task of science would be simple and short. It is rarely so. Even which phenomena are proper puzzles to take together in one experimental group may be a question that is itself a matter of doubt. For instance, are magnetic phenomena different from electrical phenomena, or are they the same?  They were studied as independent phenomena, at first. The discovery of electromagnetism unites the phenomena, and thus demands a much more subtle account than was needed to account for the phenomena of each separately. More recently, electromagnetism and gravity, once separate phenomena, seem to demand a common inductive strategy. Whether one kind of phenomenon is the same or different from another, then, is itself the product of experimental inquiry. Bacon may well have thought that the aim and work of experimental philosophy was finite and that it could be completed within a generation or two. If we live in such a world, the investigative inductive method would in fact reduce to eliminative induction as Stephen Gaukroger (2001) interprets him in his biography of Bacon. The method of eliminative induction, however, is trite: when valid, it is variation on a deductive form of argument.

Adopting Bacon’s method of induction, one does not need to assume that there are a few alternative principles among which the truth is to be found.  It may well be that Bacon himself may have believed this. If there were only a few alternatives, then all but one of them can be eliminated to establish the truth of the remaining assumption. This is the high logical road.  Bacon, however, describes the process differently, when he considers how it could appear to an unsympathetic bystander: “it will be thought, no doubt that… the goal and mark of knowledge… is not the true or the best, for that the contemplation of truth is a thing worthier and loftier than all the magnitude of works; and that this long and anxious dwelling with experience and matter and the fluctuations of individual things, drags the mind down to earth, or rather sinks it to a very Tartarus of turmoil and confusion, removing and withdrawing it from the serene tranquility of abstract wisdom, a condition far more heavenly.” ([1620] 1960) This description of an immersion in the fluctuation of individual things, and turmoil, as seen by his opponents, suggests that he is contemplating a skeptical inquiry about base things, rather than the orderly and exalted logical inquiry by eliminative induction hypothesized by Gaukroger (2001.)  Moreover, his earliest admirers in the Royal Society did not read him as an eliminative inductive logician. (Boyle [1661] 2003)  Finally, for eliminative induction to be effective, there must be a sub-procedure that determines when a list of possible first principles is complete. Neither Bacon, nor anyone else, provides even a minimally satisfactory general principle of this kind.
	Newton shows in first paper on optics that colors are an original property of light. He argues against Descartes’ interpretation of colors as states of white light. This is a classic of investigative induction. Colors in the prismatic spectrum were described by Descartes as states of white light, acquired by way of a twist at the surface of the prism. Different degrees of twist imparted to light, depending on the angle of impact, were thought to correspond to the different colors.  Conducting a number of experiments with care (i.e., skeptically) Newton takes issue with Cartesians. Descartes tried to explain the experiment that light passing through a glass prism seems to split into the spectrum. Newton showed that if we isolate light of one color out of the spectrum it does not resolve into many colors when sent through a second prism. Since the geometrical conditions are exactly duplicated, he shows that monochromatic light does not split. So white light, which does, is not monochromatic. He calls this his “crucial experiment,” or what Bacon called  “an Instance of the Finger Post.”  Newton has used all the facts that Descartes adduced, plus the discrepancy about light going through a second prism to show us that light has original colors. Newton’s adherence to Bacon’s method comes particularly in the further step he takes from there. He goes on to show that colored light when combined and mixed in the right quantitative proportions appears white to us. This is a requirement of the method that all the facts be investigated as to discrepancies. He constructs a wheel with different colored light panes of sizes that are in their size proportionate to the perceived size of the spectral colors obtained from passing light through a prism. When the wheel spins around rapidly, colored light rays will mix, appearing to the eye as white light. This is not the experimentum crucis, but it is just as important as an inductive procedure. Newton’s commitment to induction is therefore manifest in the collection of skeptical experimental oddities that he recorded before he proposed an account of colors. Once proposed, it is hard to dislodge his anti-Cartesian account because of its basis in experiment.

5. On The Supposed Impossibility of Induction
	Critics of inductive logic argue that induction is either trite or invalid. This critique depends, I suggest, upon experimentalism being taken to be a special case of empiricism.  Observation and experiment, on this account, are merely two ways of recording facts about particulars.  The experimentally established facts are harder to come by, perhaps, but it seems plausible that they are all empirical facts. If we take this plausible enough stand, then we have only ampliative induction left to us to arrive at generalities. 

	Empiricism and experimentalism are not closely related. In some ways, they are opposed. Bacon’s inductive method can be seen to work and to work well only after we have disentangled the two.​[4]​ Bacon himself tells us this. He writes of the Empirical school of philosophy as one of the idols of the theatre that we must guard ourselves against in order to practice his method.  “But the Empirical school of philosophy gives birth to dogmatism more deformed and monstrous than the Sophistical and rational school.” (Bacon, [1920] 1960 Bk.I, Aphorism LXIV) With the notable exception of Gilbert, in a limited way, he finds that the empirical school is too apt to fly to first  principles on the basis of flimsy evidence. His usual target for this charge is the Peripatetic school, but he extends his critique to the empiricist school. One needs to pay close attention to the implications of the fact that Bacon opposed assuming empiricism. It implies that Bacon was advocating a new and optimistic use for skeptical inquiry itself.

	There is the now familiar empirical theory of the origins of our ideas of things: all appearances are in the form of impressions, images or phantasms.  They are stamped upon our mind by things, like a seal impressed on a wax tablet.  If what we passively perceive is a particular, however, then it cannot speak to us.  It does not have the form of a judgment, or of a statement.  Being a thing, any claim I make about it is my claim for which I must take epistemic responsibility. If I notice a quality in a sense impression, the statement that it has this quality already takes me far beyond anything that is impressed upon my senses.  In trying to express such qualities I need to use predicates, and these predicates already presuppose too much, as Nelson Goodman has shown us (1983).  If we do find some predicates that are somehow empirical and projectible, we still face the problem of generality, which trivializes confirmation, as Hempel’s paradoxes of confirmation demonstrate (Hempel 1966).  There are possibly an infinite number of cases that a typical principle will cover. Any particular image or impression is always necessarily one of many. How can we ever establish a principle on a few such cases?  Moreover, our senses are limited both in their scope and in the manner in which they monitor the world.  How could we make any generalizations about regions of the world and things far away that are not experienced at all (as physics routinely does)?  Finally, any sense experience has a subjective character, and may not reflect an intersubjective reality, let alone an objective reality. How then do we assert so confidently, on the basis of induction, that the principles of physics, chemistry or biology describe the objective world?

	Bacon’s remarks on sensory knowledge are refreshingly different, “ … . [T]he information of the sense itself I sift and examine in many ways.  For certain it is that the senses deceive; but then at the same time they supply the means of discovering their own errors; only the errors are here, the means of discovery are to seek.

	“The sense fails in two ways. Sometimes it gives no information, sometimes it gives false information. For first, there are many things which escape the sense, even when best disposed and no way obstructed, by reason of either the subtlety of the whole body or the minuteness of parts, or distance of place, or slowness or else swiftness of motion, or familiarity of the object, or other causes.  And again when the sense does apprehend a thing its apprehension is not much to be relied upon. For the testimony and information of the sense has reference always to man, not to the universe; and it is a great error to assert that the sense is a measure of things.” ([1620] 1960)





6. Skeptical Queries Understood in Context
	The Pyrrhonian skeptic suggests that skepticism is a method or a way of inquiry, and not a belief or a dogma. This method shoes us how to confront any claim about reality with counter arguments, and arguments by counter arguments,  so that we attain a state of suspension of judgment on what is real. This method will of course accede to any belief or opinion as appearance, when it so appears.  Her judgment is suspended only about non-evident reality. The skeptic herself, of course, makes no claim about reality. Her method explicitly allows her to avoid it.  Nor does she have to postulate a particular kind of reality about which we must always suspend judgment. To do so would also trap the skeptic in dogma.  It would presuppose a real rather than an apparent distinction between appearance and reality, which is, in its turn, dogma, and not skepsis.  A Pyrrhonian skeptic cannot assent to any theory of what appearances truly are, and so she cannot assent, in particular, to empiricism as a theory of appearance.

Given different dogmatists as interlocutors, the skeptic therefore questions different kinds of reality.  The skeptic’s distinction between appearance and reality is therefore contextual, if I may express it in modern analytic terminology. It depends on her situation and on her interlocutor.  A skeptic may assent to a statement that something appears to be so, in one context, even while the same claim, made about reality, is questioned in another.  	Bacon’s skeptical method to meet the problem of the deception of the senses must also be read as contextual about what we can accept as appearance. What we are asked to hold in abeyance must include any theory of appearance, including empiricism itself.  Investigative induction from experiments begins with the suspension of judgment concerning empiricism, even if we were to antecedently believe it to be true. 

	In a certain situation, I may say, “it appears that this is so.”  I may then say, “but it is in reality otherwise.” Here the skeptic suggests that I abandon the second statement, according to her method, but recommends to me that I assent to the first, and even that it appears from another perspective otherwise. Bacon, similarly, will ask us to record both the appearance, and the discrepancy with another, and withhold judgment on the true reconciliation of the phenomena in suspension until we have collected a great many such phenomena. He is thus more skeptical than the skeptic by not assenting to the appearances, either. Skepticism itself leaps to judgment, where Bacon urges stealth.

	We note here that when a person says, “this appears to me to be so,” this appearance is expressed in the form of a statement. Such a statement may be at any level of generality. For instance, I may say, “it appears that it is going to rain.” A skeptic can assent to this belief, being an appearance.  On the basis of this assent, she may also act, by picking up an umbrella. If I ask, “is it really going to rain?” the skeptic would withhold assent, but continue to carry an umbrella.  At  a different level of generality, a physicist investigating some phenomenon may say, “symmetry seems to be conserved in this interaction.” This statement of appearance is also acceptable to a skeptic.  It describes the current interpretation among some physicists concerning some phenomenon. It is a customary belief, which the skeptic allows, albeit among some very learned specialists.  No matter, if it has the form of an appearance in its context, to a physicist today, it need not be questioned in that context. Such claims are innocuous in Bacon’s method of induction, for they are only set up for investigation. We do not rely on their truth, but on their existence, and for the existence of another appearance that is discrepant with it, to make investigative induction work.  They are each dubious candidates for truth. His method is designed to investigate appearances so that the limitations of sense lose their power over us. Instead, we gain power over the things being investigated.

7. Contrasting Empiricism and the Experimental Method
	Hume thought that induction is impossible if based in reason and experience. He was persuaded that our appearances really are impressions.  The character of an impression is of a particular.  This does not allow for the very possibility of an experimental method of investigative induction.

	The principle of empiricism, in any of its modern forms, would blunt Bacon’s experimental method.  Empiricism constitutes an answer to every possible discrepancy at once.  The impressions or the sense data we receive are not in any way in conflict with one another. They have no logical structure. They are just what they are, things of a kind. Logical conflict is to be found in the interpretation of sense data, or in the inferences we try to draw from their interpretation.  There is therefore no discrepancy in nature left to investigate. Any experimental investigation of things is replaced by introspective analysis: We investigate merely what we find within ourselves. 

This does not require that scientists abandon the project of experimental science. Those who want to experiment in Bacon’s manner can continue undeterred. It is merely that, after internalizing Hume’s account, we can no longer understand how experimental science can be as fruitful as it evidently is (“the problem of induction”). There is no apparent need for experiments, as Bacon understood it in his method, since we already know the answer to any possible discrepancy. The principle of modern empiricism stultifies Bacon’s method of induction.  

The impossibility of inductive logic, or of making valid inductive inferences, is therefore a perfectly good observation made by some logicians. But it is not a sign that induction does not work. Rather, the proper conclusion to draw is that there is no logical inference that inductively establishes a general principle, as Bacon envisaged induction, and as Aristotle (or Frege, or Russell) understood logical inference.  Induction is quite real, and seems to be a rational activity, if puzzle solving is rational. But there may be a simple logical or probabilistic model of it.

	Induction is like interpreting a book, or the work of a detective, or like the solving of a crossword puzzle. If we wish to solve 9 across, in a crossword puzzle, we note the clue “Disagreeable,” and that the word consists of 7 letters of which the first is N the third X and the last letter S. So we guess the answer.  We know that it is the right answer, when we are able to find it, because it fits the clues so well. In investigative induction, we seek discrepancies in appearances of the nature of something.  Then we catalogue all such clues that we can possibly find.  This collection of clues is Bacon’s method. When we have enough clues, we can interpret the book of nature, or solve the puzzle satisfactorily.  The method of experiment is all about setting  the right puzzle.  Since there is a real world, and it is whatever it is, we know that this puzzle, however difficult it is, has an answer. To find the true answer, we must find an answer that meets all the clues at once.  If we get the truth, then every subsequent discrepancy of that kind of thing will be described by one principle. If we do discover such a principle, we have not done so deductively, or inductively, in the sense of Aristotle. Rather we have done so by a kind of skeptical cross-examination (“interrogatories”) of nature, when we study discrepancies that are collected exhaustively. The answer we obtain is an interpretation of nature (i.e., it is investigative), and not a generalization from particulars (i.e., it is not ampliative.) This is why the experimental method of modern science escapes the inductive logician’s net.  Bacon called it “induction” and Newton called what he was doing experimentally “deducing from the phenomena,” but these are all approximate expressions.  Solving puzzles, doing detective work, is neither deductive nor inductive, as ordinarily understood. It is guesswork, yes, but we are working with very good desiderata, or clues, about what we seek. If an account meets the desiderata, we know that we have the answer that we seek. If we fail to consider all the experiments at once, considering instead each one by one, we can only spin out theories. Any one such theory may be defended, come what may (Quine1953).   The power of the conventionalist critique has been immense, from Hobbes to Quine and Davidson. Even philosophers who noticed that science is normally a kind of puzzle solving (Kuhn 1962) have assumed that it must fall under a “paradigm” to be possible at all. This conceded far too much to conventionalism, and does not appreciate enough of Bacon’s method.

	We can think of empiricism and experimentalism as a contrast between minimalism and opportunism.  The empiricist seeks the minimal input of sense, which is free of all assumptions, so that every possible discrepancy of sense has been eliminated from the pure data. This is what we allow as empirically “given.”  We can only use logic (and probability, an of logic) as a tool to tease out knowledge from this sparse beginning.  An investigative or a skeptical experimentalist, by contrast, uses herself as an instrument of learning. She is an opportunist about knowledge. All those things that she naturally knows become a part of the process of learning.  This takes advantage of the opportunity that she knows a great deal about the world, though whatever appears to her to be true is often tainted with apparent error. No matter: she makes the savoring of various apparent errors her method, and learns about the world by sifting through the discrepancies in appearance, in the manner of a Socratic dialogue.

	Bacon suggests that the skeptical or investigative experimentalist can study a wide variety of subjects as part of or an extension of her inductive investigation, and not just natural philosophy.  “It may also be asked… whether I speak of natural philosophy only or whether I mean that the other sciences, logic, ethics, and politics should be carried on by this method.  Now I certainly mean what I have said about them all….” ([1620] 1960, Bk. I. Aphorism CXXVII).  Appearances, understood in the skeptic way, is much more robust than the empiricist account of the given of sense.

	Very few experimentalists, especially after the publication of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, have repudiated the truth of the doctrine that everything that is known comes to us as representative ideas from sense, i.e., empiricism. It has seemed to many experimentalists that our knowledge of the world must come from sense.  Consequently, few nowadays distinguish the method of experiment from empiricism. We commonly think that science is based on empirical observation because science is relentlessly experimental. Whenever methodologists or even experimentalists are trying to tell us about their investigative inductive method, they soon begin talking about learning from sense impressions.  They relapse into a form of speech that is reminiscent of Locke.  Consequently, they cannot explain how investigative induction works.  But scientists can still practice it successfully, even if they cannot describe it. They teach it to their best students by example, who learn well enough by imitation, in turn, to practice it successfully.  If asked, they can only say that it is a finely cultivated attitude, a kind of learned naïveté, an ability to question the obvious.  Michael Polanyi thought that it is a tacit understanding that must remain tacit because it is a kind of personal knowledge that goes beyond what can be said (Polanyi 1967). It is a skill that must be passed on from “master” to pupil in an apprenticeship lasting many years. 

	The unfortunate conflation of the doctrine of empiricism with the investigative experimental method has led us to miss one of the great philosophical discoveries of modern times, namely how the Academic and the Peripatetic systems of philosophy were blended artfully together in an intriguing way by Bacon to give us a philosophy unlike any before it, and, regrettably, since.  

8. A Summary of Differences between the Old and the New Methods
	We can summarize in a simple table the difference between the old method of ampliative induction, in the classical tradition of science, following Aristotle, and Bacon’s new investigative experimental method.
Old Method					New Method
	1.	Explains facts by theory.		1.	Interprets facts that produce theory.
	2.	Infers from data.			2.   	Clarifies experimental difficulties.
	3.	Amplifies from what is known.	3.	Narrows the search to solve a puzzle.
	4.	Theories must diverge.		4.	Convergent theories are possible.
	5. 	Origin in sense perception.		5.	Origin in skeptical examination.
	6.	Begins with observations.		6.	Begins with an investigation.
	7.	Testing of theory is serial.		7.	Tests are simultaneous.
	8.	Knowledge aimed at is radical.	8.	Knowledge builds on what is known.

1.	The classical account of science is an explanation or an answer to a why question, as Aristotle’s method tells us.  In the new account, the theory we arrive at is an interpretative description of discrepant facts to make them compatible. We may use the new theory as an explanation, or for practical application, but neither of these is a part of the process of discovery or a desideratum of the account to be given.
2.	The old method involves two inferences, a derivation of the first principle followed by an inference from the principle to a particular case. The former inference is called “inductive,” the latter “deductive.” In the experimental method Bacon proposes, the task of science is to clarify the difficulties in a number of appearances. Deductive inferences are used in a secondary manner as a part of induction to better understand aspect of the phenomena, but there is no formal logic of the method as a whole.
3.	In the old method, a first principle must amplify from limited factual evidence to cover unlimited such facts. In the new method, the deceptions of appearance are few and far between. Their joint solution is thus not ampliative so much as it is a matter of careful discernment.
4.	Possible scientific explanations or principles, on the old method, diverge. Given the limited number of facts we know, too many theoretical explanations of them are possible. Infinitely many explanations are possible of a small number of facts. On the new method, an accumulation of clues helps our answers to converge into a unified account, if one can be found at all. This convergence is characteristic of induction.
5.	According to the old method, induction begins with sense perception.  We must somehow extract our explanatory principle or theory by generalizing from perceptual particulars.  In the new method, we begin with what appears to anyone to be true in each case, though it cannot all be true. Then we discover new principles by conducting a skeptical examination of these appearances.
6.	The old method requires that all scientific theory or principle must relate to observations ( in the form of sense perceptions.)  This is where it must begin. The new method requires that all theories begin with a thorough investigation of what is claimed or what appears to be true, in the hope of finding discrepancies.
7.	Tests of a theory on the old method can be understood one by one, so that if a theory is refuted by a single instance, we can address the problem by making changes to the theory or some other premises in the argument. On the new method, the value of a theory is that it satisfies all the experimental difficulties at once, arranged in a form of a table, as Bacon suggests, which makes for less room available for ad hoc solutions.	
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^1	  . I thank Brian Baigrie, Kristin Andrews, Ian Jarvie, Matthew Schaeffer, Itamar Tzadok and Clara Wisdom for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Not all of their queries and criticisms can be met in this paper, given its scope.
^2	  The Organon was a name for five closely related books of Aristotle: The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytic, Posterior Analytic and Topics. 
^3	  In this paper the further development of the Bacon’s method by Boyle, Newton and the other seventeenth century scientists to make it compatible with mathematical science will not be described.  Nor is it appropriate to take up the subsequent development of method to note statistical discrepancies and take probabilities into account.
^4	  Brian Baigrie had been looking at a collection of Newton’s manuscripts, at Cambridge University, entitled “Observations and Experiments.” This title led to a discussion of the difference between observations and experiments. Rose-Mary Sargent also reports a similar title for a collection of Boyle’s manuscripts (2001).
